For a year, the President of the United States attacked the man running his central bank. He demanded lower interest rates. His Justice Department opened a criminal investigation into whether that man had misled Congress about the cost of renovating a building.

Three former chairs of the Federal Reserve responded jointly. Alan Greenspan, appointed by Reagan. Ben Bernanke, appointed by Bush. Janet Yellen, appointed by Obama. They called it an unprecedented attempt to use prosecutorial attacks to undermine the independence of the Federal Reserve.

Then something happened that received very little coverage. Thom Tillis, a Republican senator, blocked the Banking Committee vote on the President’s own nominee — not because he objected to the nominee, but because he would not advance a Fed chair nomination while a criminal investigation of the sitting chairman remained open.


The US Attorney closed the investigation, referred it to the Fed’s inspector general, and said she would not hesitate to restart it. Tillis released his hold three weeks later.

## The vote
Kevin Warsh was confirmed 54–45 on 13 May. It is the narrowest margin in the history of the position.

For comparison: Volcker was confirmed to a second term 84–16, having driven interest rates above 19% and put the country through two recessions. Bernanke’s 70–30 in 2010 was reported at the time as the narrowest in the position’s history. Powell was 84–13.

Exactly one Democrat voted yes — John Fetterman of Pennsylvania.


## The turn
At his first full meeting as chairman, the committee held rates at 3.50–3.75% on a 9–3 vote. All three dissenters — Hammack of Cleveland, Kashkari of Minneapolis, Logan of Dallas — wanted to raise. That is the most dissents in favour of an increase since September 2016.

On 28 August at Jackson Hole, Warsh said underlying inflation had not “meaningfully improved” and that the Fed had “work to do.”

Market-implied odds of a September increase moved from roughly 4% to between 60 and 66% within days.


## The case against
Not everyone reads it that way. Citigroup’s Andrew Hollenhorst called the remarks only marginally more hawkish than usual and noted that inflation has been cooler and hiring softer since July. He does not expect a consensus to raise.

The increase is probable, not certain. We find out on 16 September.

## The part nobody has written about

The Federal Reserve’s own calendar lists three remaining meetings in 2026: 15–16 September, 27–28 October, and 8–9 December.

The general election is on 3 November.

The Fed announces a rate decision six days before the midterms.

Nobody suggests the Fed times policy to elections — the calendar was published long in advance and follows a fixed rhythm. But if September delivers an increase and October delivers another, borrowing costs rise twice in six weeks, with the second announcement landing while the country is already voting.

## And Powell is still in the room

His term as chair ended in May. His term as a governor runs to January 2028, and he stayed. He still holds a vote on the twelve-member committee that sets rates.

The Senate seated in January 2027 is the Senate that handles that seat when it expires. Every position on the Fed board — chair, vice chair, every governor — requires Senate confirmation.

At 53–47 the current chamber had nine votes to spare. If Democrats gain four seats, that margin becomes one.

That does not change interest rates. A confirmed chair serves four years regardless. What it changes is who can be confirmed next — and therefore who gets nominated at all.

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Every figure in the video is sourced on screen.

Sources: US Senate roll call votes · C-SPAN · federalreserve.gov · CME FedWatch · BLS · BEA via FRED · CNBC · NPR · Bloomberg · Marketplace · Deutsche Bank · Citigroup

At 12:01 in the morning on 24 July 2026, a tariff covering nearly every good entering the United States expired. Not repealed. Not struck down. It simply ran out of time.

At that same minute, a replacement regime took effect. A different statute, a different legal theory, roughly the same money — covering, by one estimate, 99.4% of American imports.

Six months earlier the Supreme Court had told this President he could not tax the world by decree. The tariffs did not stop. They changed statutes. And each time they changed statutes, they moved further away from the one body that was ever supposed to hold this power.

That body is the United States Senate. On 3 November, four seats decide who controls it.

What this briefing covers

The ruling. On 20 February 2026 the Court ruled 6–3 in Learning Resources v. Trump that IEEPA does not authorise tariffs. Roberts wrote the opinion, joined by three Democratic appointees and two other Republican ones. The Tax Foundation estimated those tariffs had raised more than $160 billion, and would have raised $1.4 trillion through 2035.

The refunds. By 31 July, Customs and Border Protection had accepted roughly $128.68 billion in potential and certified refunds for processing. That figure remains unresolved in federal court.

The replacement. Within hours of losing, the White House reimposed tariffs under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 — a statute used once before, by Nixon in 1971. It carries a 150-day limit that only Congress can extend. Congress did not extend it. It expired on schedule, and a Section 301 regime took effect the same minute, with no statutory expiration at all.

The migration. Executive tariff authority did not weaken over eighteen months. It relocated into the statutes with the least congressional oversight.

Why the Senate. In July, Senator Ron Wyden introduced the Congressional Trade Powers Reform Act, which would repeal Section 122 and require congressional approval for tariffs under Sections 201, 232 and 301. It was referred to the Finance Committee, where it remains — because committee chairmanships are determined by which party holds the majority.

And why the easy version is wrong. On 7 August, an amendment by Rand Paul and Ron Wyden to strip tariff provisions from the Russia sanctions bill was rejected 32–64. The bill itself passed 86–11. In the same month one senator moved to reclaim tariff authority, the Senate voted two to one to hand the executive more of it — with senators of both parties on the winning side.

Sources

Every figure in the video is sourced on screen. The full list:

• US Supreme Court, Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 20 February 2026

• Tax Foundation — tariff revenue estimates

• US Customs and Border Protection — refund declaration filed with the Court of International Trade, 4 August 2026

• Senate Finance Committee — S.5081, introduced 22 July 2026

• Congressional Record — Paul–Wyden amendment debate, 7 August 2026

• The Budget Lab at Yale — effective tariff rate tracker

• Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED)

• FiftyPlusOne — Senate polling averages

Where a forecast changes, we will say so. Where we are wrong, we will correct it.

Washington Blueprint publishes a briefing every day.

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