At 12:01 in the morning on 24 July 2026, a tariff covering nearly every good entering the United States expired. Not repealed. Not struck down. It simply ran out of time.

At that same minute, a replacement regime took effect. A different statute, a different legal theory, roughly the same money — covering, by one estimate, 99.4% of American imports.

Six months earlier the Supreme Court had told this President he could not tax the world by decree. The tariffs did not stop. They changed statutes. And each time they changed statutes, they moved further away from the one body that was ever supposed to hold this power.

That body is the United States Senate. On 3 November, four seats decide who controls it.

What this briefing covers

The ruling. On 20 February 2026 the Court ruled 6–3 in Learning Resources v. Trump that IEEPA does not authorise tariffs. Roberts wrote the opinion, joined by three Democratic appointees and two other Republican ones. The Tax Foundation estimated those tariffs had raised more than $160 billion, and would have raised $1.4 trillion through 2035.

The refunds. By 31 July, Customs and Border Protection had accepted roughly $128.68 billion in potential and certified refunds for processing. That figure remains unresolved in federal court.

The replacement. Within hours of losing, the White House reimposed tariffs under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 — a statute used once before, by Nixon in 1971. It carries a 150-day limit that only Congress can extend. Congress did not extend it. It expired on schedule, and a Section 301 regime took effect the same minute, with no statutory expiration at all.

The migration. Executive tariff authority did not weaken over eighteen months. It relocated into the statutes with the least congressional oversight.

Why the Senate. In July, Senator Ron Wyden introduced the Congressional Trade Powers Reform Act, which would repeal Section 122 and require congressional approval for tariffs under Sections 201, 232 and 301. It was referred to the Finance Committee, where it remains — because committee chairmanships are determined by which party holds the majority.

And why the easy version is wrong. On 7 August, an amendment by Rand Paul and Ron Wyden to strip tariff provisions from the Russia sanctions bill was rejected 32–64. The bill itself passed 86–11. In the same month one senator moved to reclaim tariff authority, the Senate voted two to one to hand the executive more of it — with senators of both parties on the winning side.

Sources

Every figure in the video is sourced on screen. The full list:

• US Supreme Court, Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 20 February 2026

• Tax Foundation — tariff revenue estimates

• US Customs and Border Protection — refund declaration filed with the Court of International Trade, 4 August 2026

• Senate Finance Committee — S.5081, introduced 22 July 2026

• Congressional Record — Paul–Wyden amendment debate, 7 August 2026

• The Budget Lab at Yale — effective tariff rate tracker

• Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED)

• FiftyPlusOne — Senate polling averages

Where a forecast changes, we will say so. Where we are wrong, we will correct it.

Washington Blueprint publishes a briefing every day.

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